This appendix first describes the Monte Carlo simulations that are mentioned in the main text. This appendix then describes an original Stata command that implements the sensitivity tests described in the main text. We show its syntax and the output from the Gerring et. al. and Allee and Scalera examples in the sensitivity section. Next, we look for patterns in the WTO false positive rates based on the replication study's subject matter, number of countries, and year. We do not find strong patterns. We also show results from Rbounds analysis of the two examples given the most attention in the main manuscript. Then, we list the studies used in the replication exercise. For each study, we give the citation, a brief description of the sample, a description of each variable that was included and the number of replications for each variable. We also note where we excluded some variables from the replications. Third, we list the ratification dates for CITES members and speak briefly about how CITES ratification patterns differ from GATT/WTO ratification patterns.
Simulations and a Generic Data Generating Process
The replication exercise in the main manuscript established that false positives are likely a problem. This section generates intuition using a controlled environment where the true data-generating process (DGP) is known. We first describe a general DGP that is theoretically grounded in our understanding of treaties and compliance. This general DGP accommodates several possible types of unobservables. We describe each type mathematically and motivate them with real-world arguments.
We then describe a simpler DGP and conduct Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate two key points. First, the false positives problem that we observed in the replication exercise was not an artifact of the studies we chose or the way we replicated the authors' results. The DGP explicitly sets the effect of a treaty on compliance to be zero, so any significant results we recover from the simulations are by definition false positives. Even in situations where the DGP is carefully controlled, commonly used approaches are prone to generate false positives.
Second, the simulations demonstrate how, as we saw in the replication exercise, using a fix for one problem can exacerbate others. When researchers choose their empirical strategy to account for one type of unobservable, they can often make things worse if other types of unobservables are present. We describe this in the manuscript as a "law of second best solutions." In economics, this term refers to situations where fixing one, but not all, market imperfections, can decrease aggregate welfare. A similar phenomenon occurs here. If the empirical model can't account for all types of unobservables, then fixing some but not all aspects of the problem may make the results more susceptible to false positives.
Data-Generating Process with Types of Unobservables
As in the main manuscript, let X it be a vector of observable characteristics of country i in year t which potentially affect both the decision to ratify a treaty and its decision to comply. Let r it be an indicator variable that equals 1 if country i ratified the treaty in year t and zero otherwise. The "1" denotes an indicator function, where the variable takes on a value of 1 if the condition in parenthesis is met. We call Equation 1 the ratification equation and Equation 2 the compliance equation.
c it = X it β + αr it + u c it
Unobservables could be like the following composite disturbances for the ratification and compliance equations, where disturbances are broken down into different "types." For each component, we use the superscripts r and c to indicate whether the observable enters the ratification or compliance equation.
Unobs. in ratification equation
Unobs. in compliance equation
Bias in estimates of α arise from the correlation between each type of unobservable across the ratification and compliance equations. We characterize the correlations between each type of unobservable in the ratification and compliance equations as follows:
cov(e r , e c ) = ρ 4
In these composite disturbances, there are three distinct types of unobservables. µ i represents a country-specific unobservable. In many contexts, we would expect this type of unobservable. Consider the difficulty in assessing whether membership in the GATT/WTO causes countries to trade more. There are many country-specific factors that affect whether/when a country joins the GATT/WTO and the amount they trade. For example, larger, more globalized and more prominent countries were among the GATT founding members. And it is entirely plausible that these countries also tend to trade more. If left unaccounted for, these factors bias us in favor of finding that GATT/WTO membership increases trade, even if it truly has no effect. Some of these factors might be easy to observe and account for. If country size is the confounding factor, then researchers could measure and control for a country's GDP in some way. Level of globalization or global prominence might be harder to observe. δ t represents a year-specific component. This component describes factors which vary over time, affecting ratification and compliance. To continue the GATT/WTO and trade example from above, there are many candidates. Shipping costs decreased over time which could encourage countries to join the GATT/WTO and also to trade more. Consumers may, increasingly over time, love a variety of international goods coming from many different suppliers which could influence GATT/WTO membership and trade. Again, the presence of these types of year-specific unobservables or global trends bias estimates of the effects of the GATT/WTO on trade upwards. Shipping costs may be easy to observe and control for, while consumer tastes may not.
γ it represents a country-specific time trend. Countries may be on different trajectories with respect to ratification and compliance. For example, new (and new new) trade theories suggest that firms or countries can benefit from economies of scale of production, which might increase their market shares or drive out competitors. It is plausible that early ratifiers of the GATT/WTO were also the types of countries who could benefit from economies of scale, which would make the trend in their amount of trade more steeply sloped over time. These types of factors may be particularly difficult to observe and measure, since they may be based on features of the world further back in time and since they might rely on relative values of certain variables.
More complex types of unobservables are certainly possible. The DGP above has linear countryspecific trends. There could be higher-order trending. Country specific unobservables could be common to a region or area, etc. Our point is not that we have exhausted the features of the real world's DGP, but rather that the problem of unobservables is multifaceted. There are many theoretically plausible types of unobservables which make estimating the effect of a treaty on compliance difficult.
Simpler Data-Generating Process and the Law of Second Best
Our two main results from the replication exercise, (1) that many fixes do not fix the problem of false positives and (2) fixes can help or hurt, obtain even with simulations from a simpler, known DGP.
The simpler DGP that we use consists of the following system of equations:
, where x it ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), α = 0, and u r it and u c it are composite random disturbances. Note that the DGP generates a continuous and binary compliance variable, which makes it more flexible than the equations described in preceding sections.
The two simplifications for this DGP are as follows. First, we include only one covariate, x it , which affects both membership and compliance. Second, we limit the "types" of selection on unobservables that are present. Since we only need two sources of correlation across disturbances to demonstrate the basic problem, we generate our disturbances as:
Each disturbance has two components, a unit and period-specific effect. These are jointly normally distributed as:
It follows that the composite disturbances are also jointly normally distributed
and that the covariance/correlation can be decomposed as
where ρ µ represents between-unit contribution to the overall covariance and ρ δ represents the within-unit contribution to the overall covariance.
For our simulations, we set the number of units or countries to be N = 100 and the number of years to be T = 30. These values are similar to those observed in the replication exercise above. We set the variance of our observable covariate equal to one (σ 2 = 1), which implies that x it accounts for half of the variance in our continuous compliance and latent compliance outcomes.
We consider results from four cases of replications. The cases differ from one another in two ways. First, moving from Case 1 to Case 4, we gradually increase the overall covariance between the ratification disturbance term and the compliance disturbance term from ρ = .25 (Case 1) to ρ = .75 (Case 4). In other words, the overall problem of selection on unobservables gradually gets worse.
The cases also differ in the type of correlation across disturbances. In our first two cases, all of the covariance between ratification and compliance disturbances is attributable to within-unit variance caused by our period effects. In our third and fourth cases, this covariance is attributable to both within-and between-unit variance in the unobservables. In other words, the first two cases involve only one type of selection on unobservables, and the second two cases involve two sources.
For our continuous compliance experiments, we evaluated the performance of three approaches: OLS without any fixed effects ("do nothing"), unit fixed-effects, and matching, as in Table 1 . We use panel-corrected standard errors with our OLS and fixed-effects estimators. For our binary compliance experiments, we evaluated the basic logit and conditional logit estimators and matching approach, as in Table 2 . We used time-period clustered and panel-bootstrapped standard errors for our logit and conditional logit estimators respectively. The matching approach is the same as in the replications. Evaluations are based on 1,000 trials.
We expect two trends in the results. First, the false-positive performance of the "do-nothing" estimators should deteriorate across our cases as we move from low to high covariance between the ratification and compliance disturbances. Second, the relative performance of our fixed-effects estimators should improve in our high covariance cases where some of the overall covariance is attributable to unit effects, but deteriorate when this is not the case.
In the case of the unit fixed effects estimator, this arises because of simultaneity bias. Ratification is endogenous if it covaries with the disturbance in the compliance equation. Fixed-effects estimators potentially reduce this covariance, but they also reduce the variance in the ratification Table 1 : MCs for Continuous DVs (N = 100, T = 30, σ = 1, 1000 trials) decisions that is leveraged to estimate their effects on compliance. The bias in the estimated treatment effect depends on both of these. The simultaneity bias increases with the strength of the covariance between ratification decisions and the unobservable determinants of compliance, but it decreases as the variance in ratification decisions increases. The first-best solution is to eliminate all of the spurious sources of covariance between ratification and compliance. If this can be done, the effect of ratification on compliance is identified. However, if only some of these sources can be eliminated, the estimator's performance can be worse than doing nothing. In fact, the second-best solution may be to do nothing. In related work, Plumper and Troeger (2013) finding that unitfixed effects strategies may be worse than pooled strategies in the presence of unobserved trending. Clarke (2005) and Clarke (2009) yield a similar finding, that inclusion of control variables has complex, possibly undesirable, effects on bias. Including an additional control variable could increase or decrease bias in the resulting estimates of interest. 1 We find both of these patterns in the results. In both Table 1 (continuous compliance) and Table 2 (binary compliance) the performance of the do-nothing OLS and matching approaches gets progressively worse as we move from Case 1 to Case 4. 2 With respect to fixed effects, as expected, we see that its performance is worse than OLS when none of ρ is attributable to between-unit covariance (ρ µ = 0) and better when half of ρ is attributable to between-unit covariance (ρ µ = .5). We are not interested in identifying the exact threshold at which fixed-effects begins to outperform OLS. This is highly dependent on the nature of the DGP. The basic point, however, is generalizable: if the fixed-effects strategy does little to address the covariance between the unobserved disturbances 99.5% 100% The rows marked ∆ Pr(c it = 1|r it = 1) denote the substantive effects of ratification in terms of first differences. They show the change in the probability that compliance = 1 for ratifiers compared to non-ratifiers. that determine both ratification and compliance, but does reduce significantly the variance in the ratification decisions, it will make the simultaneity bias worse.
The false positive rates of the matching approach further support the argument made above that, even when the researcher can achieve balance on observables, this does not insulate against false positives resulting from imbalance on unobservables. In the Monte Carlo simulations we do very well in achieving balance on observables. Yet, we still have false positives. This further confirms that our results in the replications sections above are not artifacts of failure to achieve balance on observables or failure to use a particular matching algorithm. theor. relevant indepvars is the reference set of independent variables that are theoretically relevant 3 Because sensitivity isn't just for poets and musicians.
for selection and outcome. These are the variables whose strength will be used for the benchmark of selection on observables.
treatmentvar is the binary variable indicating treatment (ratification in our examples).
other indepvars is the set of independent variables that are not theoretically related to selection.
Here is an example of the poet syntax and output for the Allee and Scalera sensitivity test using the reference set of theoretically relevant variables (combination 3 in the manuscript):
. poet lnFtrade lnpop1 gled_gdppc polity , treat(rigorous) other(totalcont domestic1_9 yr* )
Sensitivity analysis
Obs.
1.0112 Adj. ratio .90771 Selection on obs.
.4723
All of the quantities shown in the table are also stored as rclass scalars, viewable by typing return list after running the poet command.
Patterns in the False Positives
One reasonable question to ask about the replications is: are there patterns in the false positives? In other words, are certain types of studies more or less likely to generate a false positive result for the WTO exercise?
First, we checked if the false positive rates varied by the subject matter. We classified the original studies' dependent variables into four categories: Domestic Economy (e.g. growth rate, infant mortality), IPE (e.g. IMF loans), Political (e.g. change in polity score, labor laws) and Violence (e.g. civil war, torture). Then we calculated the false positive rates for each category. The results are displayed in Table 3 . The false positive rates were highest in the economic categories. To double check that our results weren't solely driven by those categories, the final two rows exclude the Domestic Economy and Domestic Economy + IPE categories. False positive rates are still too high, at 28% and 21% respectively. Second, we checked whether studies that had a global sample of countries, versus a regional focus, were more likely to have false positives. There was actually only one study that focused solely on one region. The rest had a global focus.
Third, we checked whether the number of countries in the study affected the probability of a false positive. We regressed the GATT/WTO p-value on the number of countries (OLS). The coefficient estimate was .0008301 with an associated p-value of 0.207. There does not seem to be a strong relationship between the number of countries and the false positive rates.
Fourth, we checked whether the number of years covered by the study affected the probability of a false positive. We regressed GATT/WTO p-value on the number of countries (OLS). Again, there did not appear to be a strong relationship. The coefficient estimate was .0026296 with an associated p-value of 0.227. In sum, there do not appear to be strong patterns in the false positive rates. This lends support to the idea that the potential for a false positive is widespread in applied work.
An anonymous reviewer asked for a comparison between the Altonji et al approach and more familiar Rbounds analysis for the two examples that we covered in greater detail in the paper. This was a good suggestion. For the Gerring et al false positive (that WTO membership increases tax revenue), Rbound analysis concludes that this result is likely very robust. Even a Γ of 10 is insufficient to raise the upper bound of the significance level for the treatment effect above 0.10.
On the other hand, Rbound analysis concluded that the Allee and Scalera true positive (rigorous WTO accession increases trade) was less robust. A Γ of 3 is sufficient to raise the upper bound to 0.95. Both of these Rbounds results are in Table 4 below. A full comparison of sensitivity approaches is beyond the scope of this paper, but we did find it interesting that the Altonji et al approach gave results that seemed more likely to be accurate, given theoretical knowledge. • Sample Description: "We examine the dynamics of trade and capital account liberalization in the 19 countries of the Latin American region for which data were available over the period 1985-99" (710). Approx. 218-221 observations per specification.
• DV 1: ka open.
-"The measure of capital account openness is taken from Chinn and Ito (2002) , and the reported value is the first standardized principal component for four indicators of capital account regulation: the use of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on cur-rent and capital account, and the compulsory turnover of export receipts. The variable is bounded at roughly -1.8 at the low end and 2.7 at the upper end, with a higher number indicating a more open capital account." (710) -3 specifications/replications.
• DV 2: trade index. Did not use. • Sample Description: "the spatio-temporal domain covers all countries with populations over one million from 1981 through 1999" (465). Approximately 252 observations.
• DV 1: no tort.
-o "In our firstmodel, the 'event' of interest is the termination of torture. Our data to test the aforementioned hypotheses consist of spells of torture in discrete time format. The data cover the years 198199, and there are 3,587 country-years in the data. Of those, 2,341 countryyears are 'at risk' to stopping torture (i.e., that many cases were engaged in torture in the preceding year). The data include 146 countries, and there are a total of 284 spells of torture (i.e., countries that either had a reported use of torture in 1981 when the data set begins or had a reported use of torture in a year after 1981 after having had at least one year in which no uses of torture were uncovered)" (467 • DV 1: amtgdp.
-Loan size / log(GDP) -1 specifications/replications.
• DV 2: amtqta.
-Loan size / log(quota) -2 specifications/replications.
• DV 3: amtsdr.
-Loan size / log(millions of SDR) -1 specifications/replications.
• DV 4: Imfloan.
-A dummy indicating a new IMF loan for that country-year -1 specifications/replications.
• DV 5: Bt.
-Total number of benchmarks/indicative targets -2 specifications/replications.
• DV 6: pa.
-Number of performance actions -2 specifications/replications.
• DV 7: pc.
-Number of performance criteria -2 specifications/replications. • Sample Description: I constructed a dataset of elections in EA regimes from 1990 to 2007. The units of analysis are national elections, both presidential and legislative. Creation of the dataset proceeded in several steps. First, Geddes, Wright, and Franz's (2012; GWF hereafter) data were used to identify the set of autocratic regime-years. These data, which cover all countries in the world from 1946 to 2010, expand and improve upon Geddes (1999) earlier coding.7 Within this set, I define the sample of electoral authoritarian regimes as those in which multiple parties are allowed to contest elections. If the ruling party or candidate won less than 75 percent of the votes (presidential contests, first round) or seats (legislative elections) in the last election, the regime is classified as a CAR; otherwise, it is classified as a HAR." (707). Generally, 176-7 observations. • DV 1: ed trans.
-"The dependent variable of the analysis is a transition to electoral democracy. I employ a dummy variable indicating whether a country moved from a "0" to a "1" on Freedom House's list of electoral democracies in the year of the election in question." (708) -5 specifications/replications. • Sample Description: Minimally democratic countries from 1960-2000 "Because the theory of centripetalism is applicable only within a democratic framework, we limit all regression analyses to country-years that are minimally democratic, as discussed earlier.
Resulting samples vary from a minimum of 77 countries to a maximum of 126, and from a minimum of 14 years to a maximum of 4 decades " (pg 574).. • DV 1: Bureaucratic Quality PRSF.
-"a measure of political development, is an indicator ranging from 0 to 6 (with higher scores indicating higher quality) developed by the Political Risk Services (PRS) group as part of its International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)" (pg. 573). -2 specifications/replications.
• DV 2: Life Expectancy ipolate lnF.
-"measures the expected tenure of life in a country at birth, extrapolating from mortality statistics available at that time (Bos, Vu, and Stephens 1992; Riley 2001; logarithm, data source: World Bank 2003) . Like IMR, life expectancy is an overall measure of human development strongly influenced by government policies; hence, it provides a good indicator of the quality of governance in a country." (574). -2 specifications/replications.
• DV 3: IMR ipolate lnF.
-"is measured by the infant mortality rate (IMR), the number of deaths per one thousand lives births that occur in the first year of life (logarithm, data source: World Bank 2003). IMR, a primary measure of human development, is affected by many government policies (particularly social policies) and is thus an important outcome-based measure of good governance." (574).
• DV 4: Illiteracy imputed lnF.
-"is measured as the percentage of people age 15 and older who cannot, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life (logarithm, data source: World Bank 2003). Literacy has become a standard feature of human development indices in recent decades and largely reflects the success of government-sponsored education policies." (574). -2 specifications/replications.
• DV 5: Tax Revenue WDIF.
-"The variable employed here, drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank 2003), measures aggregate tax revenues, considered as a share of GDP. More specifically, it counts compulsory, unrequited, nonrepayable receipts for public purposes collected by the central government, including interest collected on tax arrears and penalties collected on nonpayment or late payments of taxes" (pg 573). -2 specifications/replications.
• DV 6: Risk EuromoneyF.
-"Euromoney ratings are based on polls of economists and political analysts and supplemented by quantitative data such as debt ratios and access to capital markets. The overall country rating derives from nine separate categories, each with an assigned weighting (in parentheses): (1) political risk (25%); (2) economic performance (25%); (3) debt indicators (10%); (4) debt in default or rescheduled (10%); (5) credit ratings (10%); (6) access to bank finance (5%); (7) access to short-term finance (5%); (8) access to capital markets (5%); and (9) discount on forfeiting (5%) (Euromoney 2004)" (pg 573). -2 specifications/replications.
• Didn't use trade openness or GDP per capita. • Sample Description: 1960-2000. Generally, about 2,700+ observations.163 countries..
• "We use two dependent variables to test the effects of in dependent judiciaries within the state, both of which are drawn from the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) dataset. First, we examine any negative changes in overall regime score (autocracy/democracy). Normally, the combined score ranges from 10 to +10. However, since we are using the Henisz data, which rely on the executive constraints composite of Polity IV data, our scale omits executive constraints, and thus ranges from 7 to +6. Consequently, states that are considered democracies on this adjusted scale range from 3 to 6 (instead of 6 to 10 on the Polity scale). The second dependent variable is based on the first. Since the literature on regime reversion depends heavily on crisis mechanisms and regime collapses, we also include analyses of large-magnitude regime changes, which we define as negative changes of 4 points or more.4 Both of these dependent variables are dichotomous and measure only the presence of any negative change or a large-magnitude regime change." 701-702
• DV 1: negpolchg.
-This is the regime change variable.
-4 specifications/replications.
• DV 2: neg4polchg.
-o This is the regime collapse variable.
-4 specifications/replications. • Sample Description: "We compiled our data from open sources to construct a crossnational time-series data set covering the period 1955 through 2003 for all countries with a population over 500,000. We identified 'instability episodes' in part by identifying conflicts from existing databases (such as the Correlates ofWar) and in part by consulting with area experts." (191) . Table 1 N ranges from 196-468.
• DV 1: sftpcons.
-Onset of an instability episode -9 specifications/replications. • Sample Description: "We model the relationship between each country's col lective labor rights outcomes and those of its trading partners using country-year data for 90 developing countries over the period 1986-2002. Countries from Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and the Middle East are included in our sample; we exclude the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those from the former Soviet Union. Omitted country-years from the developing regions are those for which data on one or more independent variables are not available." (675).
• DV 1: lawpos.
-The first measure, Labor Laws, gives an indication of the extent to which laws have been put in place to safeguard collective labor rights, such as the rights to organize, bargain collec tively, and strike. (675) -3 specifications/replications.
• DV 2: practicepos.
-The second measure, Labor Practices, provides an indication of the degree to which labor rights are violated in practice. (675) -3 specifications/replications. 9. Citation: "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" Nikolay Marinov. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Jul., 2005) , pp. 564-576.
• Sample Description: "I include in the test all countries with population over 500,000 (N = 160), and the period 1947 to 1999. This makes for a total of 6,782 observations in the full data-set." (568).
• DV 1: fail.
-Leadership change. "The principal source of data on government leaders is Chiozza and Goemans (2004b), as updated by Goemans et al. (2004) ." (569 • Sample Description: 139 countries, 1981-2005 . N ranges from 698 to 2627 in main Table. .
• DV 1: prio.
-UCDP PRIO civil war data, binary indicator for 25 or more battle deaths from civil war -2 specifications/replications. • Sample Description: 129-131 countries, I think 1980-2005.
• DV 1: dispute.
-"For our analysis, we use data from the High Pro file Strikes Dataset (HPSD), which allows for the analyst to distinguish among a greater number of strike charac teristics and corrects for some of the reporting bias of available measures. The data for the HPSD come from press reports, which were gathered using broad search terms (e.g., 'labor' and 'strikes') to gather all articles in the 'World Publications' section of the Nexis database documenting political or economic trade union protest in all countries that could be categorized as 'non-OECD countries' as of 1980. • Sample Description: 1950-2001, country years, but dropping subsequent onsets (350) . N = 5567 in the main table.
• DV 1: nonset.
-"Our conflict data come from the Uppsala0PRIO Conflict Data Set These data identify instances of armed conflict involving more than twenty-five casualties in a given calendar year+ As a robustness check, we also reestimate our model, restricting the analysis to more severe wars involving at least 1,000 battle deaths over the course of the conflict For our dependent variable, we include data on intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts where a state experiences conflict on its own territory, as classified by the location variable in the Uppsala PRIO data set Our main dependent variable is conflict onset, which is coded 1 for the first year of a conflict and 0 if no conflict takes place in the state in that particular year+ Subsequent ongoing years of the same conflict are dropped from the estimation sample In cases where there were multiple conflict onsets in a country, data on a new onset was included if it occurred during the years when another conflict was ongoing." (350) -5 specifications/replications.
• DV 2: bigconset.
-1 specifications/replications. -"The dependent variable is Conflict Initiation, a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 for a given year if a domestic conflict with at least 25 battle deaths be gins after at least two years without an initiation. We use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset for this variable (Gleditsch et al. 2002) ." -5 specifications/replications. • Sample Description: "To test the preceding hypotheses, an updated version of Geddes (1999) data on authoritarian regime types is used. The updated data include monarchies and author See the web appendix for updated regime type (A) and legislatures coding (B), with a brief review of the coding rules. itarian regime-years for regimes that lasted less than four years. I then updated Przeworski and colleague's (2000) data on authoritarian legislature and parties through 2002. As Table 4 shows, legislatures are present in 69% of personalist regime-years, 62% of monarchy regimeyears, 92% of single-party regime-years, but only 37% of military regime-years. While all regimes are more likely to have legislatures in the postCold War period, significant variation exists in the dependent variable during this period." (329).
• DV 1: growth.
- Table 7 -2 specifications/replications.
• DV 2: InvestGDP.
-DV in table 6.
-2 specifications/replications.
• DV 3: legislature.
-DV in table 5.
-1 specifications/replications.
• There were tons of specifications. We didn't use all of them, to make sure this paper wasn't massively over-represented. • Sample Description: "To test the preceding hypotheses, I use an updated version of Geddes's (2003) data on authoritarian regimes. (Wright 2008) . The original data were updated by including monarchies, post-Soviet regimes in Central Asia, and authoritarian regime-years for regimes that lasted fewer than three years. The updated data are grouped into four main types of authoritarian regimes: military, monarchy, personalist, and single party." (556-557).
• DV 1: dem.
-Tranisition to democracy, Table 2 .
• DV 2: dpol3.
-Change in polity, table 3.
CITES Ratification Dates
The most important feature of the CITES replications is that there is unlikely to be a strong theoretical link between CITES and the replication dependent variables. Another good feature is that CITES ratification patterns are different from GATT/WTO ratification/accession patterns. Large, liberal democracies tend to be the fastest GATT/WTO joiners, which is a potential explanation for some of the false positive results. This is not the case with CITES.
There is a diverse group of joiners at each stage, mainly because the treaty is based on endangered species protection. Below, we list the ratification and accession dates for the CITES countries. This list contains the countries which were included in at least one of the 13 of 16 replication studies that used Correlates of War country codes. This information can be found at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php?order=field_country_date_of_joining&sort=asc (Accessed 2-27-2015). 
